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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Anthony Robert Bonilla appeals from his judgments of conviction and concurrent 
sentences for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and unlawful 
possession of a firearm, entered upon his conditional guilty plea.  On appeal, he claims 
that the district court erred when it denied his suppression motion and that it abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On May 18, 2015, Officer Weir was serving in the Penninger Drive neighborhood 
as a contact officer in an unmarked car.  (R., p.101.)  Acting on a tip, he surveilled a 
“problem house” in the neighborhood, during which he saw a shotgun in the back of a 
brown Chevy Blazer.  (Id.)  Officer Weir contacted a nearby canine officer, Officer 
Reimers, and followed the vehicle as it left the location.  (Id.)  Both officers observed the 
Blazer speeding and failing to properly signal.  (Id.)  Officer Reimers activated his lights 
and pulled over the Blazer as it entered the onramp to Interstate 84.  (R., p.102.)  
Officer Reimers requested backup as he approached the vehicle and then contacted the 
driver.  (Id.)  Running the driver’s license and registration through dispatch, Officer 
Reimers identified the driver as Bonilla and learned that he had previously been 
arrested for burglary.  (R., pp.102, 104.) 
At the same time, a white Honda pulled over in front of Bonilla’s vehicle and 
stopped.  (R., p.102.)  Officer Reimers had the backup officers direct the other car to 
leave while he returned to Bonilla, whom he found talking on a cellphone.  (Id.)  Bonilla 
acknowledged that he knew the driver of the other car.  (Id.)  Officer Reimers asked 
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Bonilla to step out of his vehicle, which Bonilla briefly refused to do before ultimately 
complying.  (Id.)  As Bonilla exited the vehicle, Officer Reimers saw a six-inch mag-light 
on the driver’s side floorboard, which he knew could be used as a weapon.  (R., p.103.)  
Officer Reimers asked Bonilla for consent to search him for weapons, and Bonilla 
consented to the search.  (Id.)  Because he had previously been stuck by a syringe, 
rather than patting Bonilla, Officer Reimers lifted Bonilla’s baggy shirt to visually inspect 
his waistband, as the officer knew that is where weapons are commonly concealed.  
(Id.)  Protruding from one of Bonilla’s pockets, Officer Reimers observed what he 
suspected from his training and experience was a baggie of marijuana.  (Id.) 
Officer Reimers had intended to have one of the backup officers write Bonilla’s 
traffic citations while he ran his drug dog around Bonilla’s vehicle.  (Id.)  Instead, he 
placed Bonilla under arrest for possession of marijuana and then deployed his drug dog.  
(Id.)  The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and during a subsequent search of the 
vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine, hydrocodone, Temazepam, Quetiapine, 
paraphernalia, and the shotgun.  (Id.) 
The state charged Bonilla with possession of methamphetamine with the intent to 
deliver; possession of hydrocodone; unlawful possession of a firearm; possession of 
marijuana; possession of Temazepam; possession of Quetiapine without a prescription; 
and possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.26-28.)  Bonilla filed a motion seeking 
suppression of all evidence and statements, arguing that the officer’s search for 
weapons violated his constitutional rights.  (R., pp.39-50.)  After a hearing on the motion 
(10/8/2015 Tr.), the district court denied Bonilla’s suppression motion (R., pp.100-09). 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement (R., p.120), Bonilla entered a conditional guilty 
plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and unlawful possession 
of a firearm (10/22/2015 Tr., p.17, L.19 – p.20, L.14) and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges (R., p.122).  The district court entered judgment against Bonilla and 
sentenced him to concurrent unified terms of 10 years with two fixed on the possession 
with intent to deliver and five years with two fixed on the unlawful possession. 





Bonilla states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonilla’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced 
Mr. Bonilla to a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, for 
possession with intent to deliver, and to five years, with two years fixed, 
for unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served concurrently? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
1. Has Bonilla failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his suppression 
motion? 
 
2. Has Bonilla failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
sentencing him to concurrent unified terms of 10 years with two years fixed for 
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and five years with two years 











Bonilla argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-14.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found 
by the district court shows no error in the court’s order denying Bonilla’s suppression 
motion.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 
843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004). 
 
C. The Search Of Bonilla’s Vehicle Was Supported By Probable Cause 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
Warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  One such exception to the warrant requirement is the 
“automobile exception,” which allows warrantless searches of vehicles when there is 
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probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal 
activity.  See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State v. Tucker, 
132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).  “Probable cause is established if the 
facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched contained 
contraband or evidence of a crime.”  State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 
1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)). 
Law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the 
detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 
536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 2005).  “When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a 
lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has 
probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it 
without a warrant.”  Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005)).  “If probable cause 
justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle 
and its contents which could conceal the object of the search.”  State v. Braendle, 
134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000). 
In this case, pursuant to his conditional guilty plea, Bonilla was ultimately 
convicted of (1) possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver—with that 
intent based on the way the drugs were packaged and the presence of a scale—and (2) 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.122-23; see also 10/22/2015 Tr., p.18, Ls.15-
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22.)  The methamphetamine and shotgun were found during the search of Bonilla’s 
vehicle.  (R., p.104.)  As the district court noted, that search was based on probable 
cause after the drug detection dog alerted on the vehicle.  (R., p.109.)  Therefore, 
though it was warrantless, the search fell under a well-established exception to the 
warrant requirement and was valid. 
At no time below did Bonilla argue that his detention had been unlawfully 
prolonged to allow the drug dog’s sniff.  Instead he asserted—contrary to both the law 
and the court’s factual findings—that absent the discovery of the drugs on Bonilla’s 
person the officer would not have deployed the drug dog.  (10/08/2015 Tr., p.51, L.8 – 
p.52, L.5.)  As noted above, and by Bonilla on appeal, deployment of the drug dog did 
not require reasonable suspicion, see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08, much less finding 
drugs on Bonilla’s person.  And as found by the district court, Officer Reimers intended 
to deploy the drug dog in any event.  (R., p.103.) 
Now for the first time on appeal Bonilla appears to argue that deploying the drug 
dog would have prolonged the search absent Bonilla’s arrest for possession of 
marijuana.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)  This argument fails, not only because it was 
never raised below and therefore should be considered on appeal, see Nelson v. 
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007) (“Appellate court review is 
limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.”); State v. 
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Issues not 
raised below generally may not be considered for the first time on appeal.”), but it also 
fails on the merits as well.  As specifically found by the district court, “Officer Reimers 
had intended to have Officer Jones continue writing the citation when the Defendant 
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exited the vehicle while Officer Reimers deployed his drug-sniffing canine around the 
vehicle.”  (R., p.103.)  An officer may deploy a drug detection dog while another officer 
writes out a traffic citation.  State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362-63, 17 P.3d 301, 
306-07 (Ct. App. 2000).  The traffic stop, therefore, would not have been prolonged by 
the deployment of the drug dog. 
Bonilla also argues that the drug dog’s sniff was unlawful in this case because 
the dog alerted inside the vehicle and, he contends, it is impermissible for an officer to 
facilitate a dog’s sniff inside of a vehicle.  (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  Again this argument 
was never raised below and so should not be addressed on appeal.  Nelson, 144 Idaho 
at 714, 170 P.3d at 379; Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 367, 347 P.3d at 1028.  Even if 
addressed, it still fails on its merits because Officer Reimers did not facilitate the drug 
dog’s sniff of the interior of Bonilla’s vehicle.   
The Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of facilitation in State v. 
Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258, 359 P.3d 1055 (2015).  In that case, the drug detection dog 
alerted to the presence of drugs after it inserted its nose into the open window of a 
stopped vehicle.  Id. at 259, 359 P.3d at 1056.  The handling officer did not facilitate the 
dog’s entry into the window; rather, the handler directed the dog to sniff along the 
vehicle’s seam and the dog instinctively sniffed inside the window, which Naranjo had 
left open.  Id.  Under those facts, consistent with the federal courts that had previously 
decided the issue, the Court of Appeals held that the drug detection dog’s sniff of the 
interior of the car did not amount to a search.  Id. at 261, 359 P.3d at 1058.   
Similarly in this case, there was no facilitation of the drug dog’s sniff of the 
interior of Bonilla’s vehicle.  First, Officer Reimers never opened Bonilla’s car door for 
 
9 
the drug dog; Bonilla opened the car’s door as he exited the vehicle.  (R., p.57; 
6/17/2015 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-24.)  Bonilla apparently failed to shut his vehicle’s door. 
(R., p.58; 6/17/2015 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-15.)  Second, even with that open door, the officer 
did not deploy the dog next to it.  Rather, Officer Reimers deployed his canine at the 
front license plate of Bonilla’s vehicle and then worked the dog counterclockwise.  (R., 
p.58; 6/17/2015 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-14.)  The dog, without any apparent command or 
coaxing, simply jumped into the car when it reached the open door.  (Id.)  Because the 
officers did not facilitate the dog’s instinctual sniff of the interior of Bonilla’s vehicle, the 
drug dog’s conduct did not constitute a search. 
Bonilla does not cite Naranjo.  Instead, to support his argument that facilitation is 
impermissible, Bonilla relies on the opinions of the federal courts that had previously 
decided the issue:  United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209 (3rd Cir. 2010); and United States v. Winningham, 140 F.3d 
1328 (10th Cir. 1998).  Bonilla’s reliance is misplaced—not because facilitation is 
permissible, but because those cases show that there was no facilitation in this case.  In 
Sharp, the Seventh Circuit “join[ed its] sister circuits in holding that a trained canine’s 
sniff inside of a car after instinctively jumping into the car is not a search that violates 
the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not encourage or facilitate the dog’s 
jump.”  Sharp, 689 F.3d at 620.  One of those sister circuits was the Third Circuit which, 
in Pierce, also held that “a trained narcotic dog’s instinctive action of jumping into the 
car does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”  Pierce, 622 F.3d at 213-14 (citation 
omitted).  That court noted that “instinctive” implied “the dog enters the car without 
assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler.”  Id. at 214. 
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As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Sharp, the Tenth Circuit was the first to 
adopt the “instinctive action” rule in United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 
1989).  In that case a drug dog instinctively jumped into Stone’s vehicle, through a door 
which Stone himself had voluntarily opened, before alerting on a duffel bag.  Stone, 
866 F.2d at 361-62.  The court determined that the dog’s instinctive actions did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment where the officers did not encourage the dog’s entry into 
the car and did not open the door, or require Stone to open the door, for the purpose of 
facilitating the dog’s entering the car.  Id. at 364.  In Winningham, the 10th Circuit 
distinguished its Stone rule, concluding that, unlike in Stone, the officers had facilitated 
the drug dog’s sniff of the interior of the vehicle when they opened the van door and 
then unleashed the drug dog next to the open door.  Winningham, 140 F.3d at 1331.  
Factually, as shown above, this case resembles Stone, not Winningham.   
The officers’ search of Bonilla’s vehicle, which led to the discovery of all the 
evidence upon which he was ultimately convicted, was supported by probable cause 
after the drug dog’s alert on the vehicle.  (See R., p.109.)  Bonilla never challenged the 
deployment of the drug dog below nor the dog’s positive alert on his vehicle.  The 
challenges to that search which he raises on appeal, in addition to being unpreserved, 
fail on their merits.  The district court correctly denied Bonilla’s motion to suppress and 
should be affirmed. 
 
D. Bonilla Consented To The Preceding Search Of His Person 
In his suppression motion, instead of challenging the basis of probable cause for 
the search of his vehicle, Bonilla instead chose to challenge the officer’s basis of 
reasonable suspicion for the frisk conducted by the officer.  (R., pp.44-49.)  On appeal 
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Bonilla raises the same challenges.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-11.)  Bonilla’s challenges 
are irrelevant to the determination of any ultimate issue on appeal.  As noted above, 
Bonilla was convicted, pursuant to his guilty plea, of possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm.  Even if Bonilla could 
show that his frisk violated the Fourth Amendment, at best that might result in 
suppression of the marijuana found on his person;1 it would not result in suppression of 
the methamphetamine or the firearm. 
As explained above, the methamphetamine and firearm were discovered in 
Bonilla’s vehicle.  The search of Bonilla’s vehicle was supported by probable cause from 
the drug dog’s positive alert.  Discovery of the marijuana on Bonilla’s person, while 
sufficient to support his arrest, would not allow officers to search beyond the driver’s 
immediate reach within the automobile incident to that arrest.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 346-47 (2009).  By the same token, even had officers illegally searched Bonilla’s 
person, the subsequent search of the vehicle—supported by independent probable 
cause—would not be tainted by the preceding illegal search and would therefore not be 
subject to suppression.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) 
(suppression improper if evidence was discovered by “means sufficiently distinguishable 
to be purged of the primary taint.”). 
In addition to being irrelevant to the determination of any ultimate issue in this 
case, Bonilla’s challenges fail on their merits on at least two bases:  First, Officer 
Reimers’ search of Bonilla’s person for weapons was done pursuant to his consent.  
                                            
1 Even then, the marijuana would still likely be admissible evidence due to its inevitable 
discovery incident to Bonilla’s arrest on the firearm, methamphetamine, and 
paraphernalia found in his vehicle. 
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Second, even if the search was not valid under Bonilla’s consent, as Bonilla argues on 
appeal (Appellant’s brief, p.7), it was still within the scope of a proper search for 
weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
A search done pursuant to consent is another well-established exception to the 
warrant requirement.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted); State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003).  Freely and 
voluntarily given consent validates a search.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations 
omitted).  The district court found that Bonilla consented to a search of his person for 
weapons.  (R., p.107.)  This finding is supported by substantial, even if conflicting, 
evidence (see R., p.58; 6/17/2015 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-17) and so should not be disturbed on 
appeal.  Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (1983)).  The court found that 
Bonilla’s consent was voluntary and correctly concluded that the officer did not exceed 
the scope of that consent.  (R., pp.107-08.)   
Even if Bonilla had not voluntarily consented to the search of his person for 
weapons, Officer Reimers’ search still would have been proper under Terry.  In Terry, 
the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may conduct a search of an 
individual for weapons if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person may be 
armed and presently dangerous.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 24; see also State v. Rawlings, 
121 Idaho 930, 933, 829 P.2d 520, 523 (1992).  The justification for a Terry search is 
the protection of police officers in the performance of their duties.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
“The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow 
the Officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.”  Adams v. Williams, 
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407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); Rawlings, 121 Idaho at 933, 829 P.2d at 523.  Determination 
of whether a Terry search is valid presents a dual inquiry of whether the officer’s search 
was reasonable both at its inception and in its scope as conducted.  See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27-29.   
As determined by the district court, Officer Reimers’ search was reasonable both 
at inception and in scope.  (R., pp.106-08.)  First, as found by the district court, there 
were sufficient facts for the officer to conclude that Bonilla could be dangerous:  Bonilla 
was on his cell phone when he was stopped by police; a second car arrived at the 
scene and stopped near Bonilla’s vehicle; Bonilla initially refused to exit his vehicle; and 
Bonilla had a mag-light on the driver’s side floorboard, which could have been used as a 
weapon.  (R., p.107.)  Additionally, Officer Reimers had learned from Officer Weir that 
Bonilla had a shotgun in the vehicle.  (R., p.101.)  Second, as determined by the district 
court, Officer Reimers’ search of Bonilla, in which he merely lifted Bonilla’s baggy shirt 
to see if he had any weapons in his waistband, “was not overly intrusive” and “was 
reasonable to ensure [Bonilla] had no weapons.”  (R., pp.107-08.) 
On appeal, Bonilla challenges the scope of Officer Reimers’ search, arguing that 
“lifting … Bonilla’s T-shirt was not a permissible Terry pat down.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.9-10.)  Bonilla is mistaken.  As federal circuit courts have explained, “Terry does not 
in terms limit a weapons search to a so-called ‘pat down’ search.  Any limited intrusion 
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault are [sic] 
permissible.”  United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976); accord United 
States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that limiting Terry 
searches to a pat-down of the outer surface of clothing is “incorrect because the 
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reasonableness of a protective search depends on the factual circumstances of each 
case.”); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Terry does not 
limit a weapons search to a pat-down.  Any reasonably limited intrusion designed to 
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other instruments of assault is permissible.”). 
The Supreme Court explained in Terry that the “limitations [applicable to Terry 
searches] will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual 
cases.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.  In light of that instruction, federal and state courts have 
upheld as reasonable searches that went beyond patting down the outer surface of 
clothing.  See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (reaching into a 
suspect’s belt permissible under Terry); Stanley v. United States, 6 A.3d 270, 276-77 
(D.C. 2010) (shaking a defendant’s belt permissible under Terry); Baker, 78 F.3d at 138 
(directing a defendant to lift his shirt before conducting a preliminary pat-down 
permissible under Terry); North Carolina v. Smith, 562 S.E.2d 899 (N.C. App. 2002) 
(lifting defendant’s shirt to expose a possible weapon permissible under Terry); Hill, 
545 F.2d at 1193 (same); United States v. Edmonds, 948 F.Supp. 562, 566 (E.D.Va. 
1996) (same), aff’d, 149 F.3d 1171 (4th Cir. 1998).   
While general exploratory searches for evidence are precluded under Terry, any 
limited intrusion that is reasonably designed to uncover weapons that could be used to 
assault the officer should be allowed.  Ultimately, “the ‘touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.’”  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting 
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433, 439 (1973).  The question for reviewing courts is an objective one:  “Would the 
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search ‘warrant a man of 
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reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”  Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 
89, 96-97 (1964)).  Lifting a baggy t-shirt to allow the officer to see Bonilla’s waistband 
was nonintrusive and reasonable under the circumstances of this case. 
The search of Bonilla’s vehicle, which led to discovery of the methamphetamine 
and firearm, was supported by probable cause from the drug dog’s positive alert.  The 
search of Bonilla, though not relevant to any ultimate issue on appeal, was also valid 
under either Bonilla’s voluntary consent or under the Terry exception.  The district court 
correctly denied Bonilla’s suppression motion, and its order should be affirmed. 
 
II. 
Bonilla Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
Bonilla argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing concurrent sentences of 10 years with two years fixed 
and five years with two years fixed on his convictions for possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-17.)  Bonilla has failed to establish an abuse of the district 
court’s sentencing discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 




C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Sentencing Bonilla To 
Concurrent Unified Terms Of 10 Years With Two Years Fixed For Possession Of 
Methamphetamine With Intent To Deliver And Five Years With Two Years Fixed 
For Unlawful Possession Of A Firearm 
 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish 
that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 
38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  
To carry this burden, Bonilla must show that his sentence is excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is 
reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any 
or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).  While the Court reviews the 
whole sentence on appeal, it presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant’s probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 
170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).  In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its 
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.  State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The district court considered the relevant factors and properly exercised its 
discretion by imposing a sentence that would offer some protection for society from 
Bonilla, perhaps deter future criminality, allow for rehabilitation, and provide some 
punishment.  (12/10/2015 Tr., p.65, L.19 – p.69, L.2.)  Despite his arguments below and 
on appeal, Bonilla was no candidate for probation.  Bonilla has a lengthy criminal history 
spanning two decades and four states.  (See PSI, pp.5-10.)  In addition to this case, his 
prior convictions include multiple felony counts out of California for burglary, receiving 
stolen property, and grand theft.  He has also been convicted in Washington and Idaho 
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of misdemeanor thefts, driving under the influence, possession of weapons at school, 
and other crimes.  On the day of sentencing, the district court notified the parties that it 
had learned that Bonilla also had a criminal complaint and bench warrant out of North 
Dakota.  (12/10/2015 Tr., p.55, Ls.11-14; see also PSI p.4.)   
Moreover, Bonilla’s criminal history shows a certain disregard for the law.  Not 
only does he have multiple convictions for driving on a suspended license or driving 
without privileges, obstructing officers, and providing false identity to officers, but Bonilla 
also has multiple probation violations.  (PSI, pp.11-13.)  He was also assessed as a 
high risk to reoffend.  (PSI, pp.20-23.)   
Finally, Bonilla seeks to minimize his criminal conduct.  Below, in his attempts to 
minimize his unlawful possession of a firearm, he claimed he only used the shotgun for 
recreation (10/22/2015 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-11) and/or that it was his wife’s gun (PSI, p.9).  
Even on appeal Bonilla maintains that the shotgun “was strictly a bird hunting gun” 
(Appellant’s brief, p.15), as though that would somehow make his possession less 
unlawful.  While Bonilla does acknowledge that “[p]ossession with intent to deliver and 
unlawful possession of a firearm are certainly serious crimes,” he then attempts to 
deflect that seriousness by noting that he “was stopped in a traffic stop that was not so 
serious.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.)  Of course, Bonilla’s concurrent sentences were 
not imposed for his “not so serious” traffic infractions; they were imposed for his 
“certainly serious crimes” of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and 
unlawful possession of a firearm. 
The sentences imposed by the district court, far from being excessive, were, if 
anything, lenient and are supported by the seriousness of Bonilla’s crimes and Bonilla’s 
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history of criminality.  Bonilla has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing concurrent unified sentences of incarceration of 10 years with 
two fixed and five years with two fixed on his respective possession with the intent to 
deliver and unlawful possession convictions.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bonilla’s judgment of 
conviction and concurrent sentences for possession of methamphetamine with the 
intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm. 
 DATED this 29th day of September, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_______ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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